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 [\mathrm{T}]\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e} development of philosophy since the Renaissance has by and large gone
from right to left Particularly in physics, this development has reached a
peak in our own time, in that, to a large extent, the possibility of knowledge
of the objectivisable states of affairs is denied, and it is asserted that we must
be content to predict results of observations. This is really the end of all theo‐
retical science in the usual sense (Kurt Gödel, The modern development of the
foundations of mathematics in the light of philosophy, lecture never delivered)1
1 Unity, Disunity, and Pluralistic Unity
Since the modernist killing of natural philosophy seeking a universal conception of the
cosmos as a united whole, our system of knowledge has been optimised for the sake of each
particular domain, and has accordingly been massively fragmented and disenchanted (in
terms of Webers theory of modernity). Today we lack a unified view of the world, living
in the age of disunity surrounded by myriads of uncertainties and contingencies, which
invade both science and society as exemplified by different sciences of chance, including
quantum theory and artificial intelligence on the basis of statistical machine learning,
and by the distinctively after‐modern features of risk society (in terms of the theories of
late/reflexive/liquid modermity), respectively (this is not necessarily negative like quite
some people respect diversity more than uniformity; contemporary art, for example, gets
a lot of inspirations from uncertainties and contingencies out there in nature and society).
This modern and late‐modern process of disunification and contextualisation in favour of
scientific and other sorts of pluralism rather than monism has gone hand‐in‐hand with:
lAccording to Gòdel, scepticism, materialism and positivism stand on the left side, and metaphysics, idealism and
theology on the right. Gödels philosophy of physics is rarely addressed, the only exception being his work on general
relativity, and yet this manuscript suggests his position is never naive realism/platonism. He indeed pays prudent attention
towhat he calls the left spirit of the time, some sort of antirealism or agnosticism, and seriously attempts to make foundations
of mathematics cohere with it through Kantian epistemology and Husserlian phenomenology. It is an endeavour to reconcile
the right and the left, and in the present article we shall address exactly the same issue with the idea of duality (between
the right and the left). Apart from that, this quote also sounds like Chomskys criticism of statistical data science, and the




\bullet the late‐modern shift of analytic philosophy from the Vienna circle to the Stanford
school, the former advocating the unity of science, as seen in their series of pub‐
lications entitled International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and the latter the
disunity of science, as seen in their publications such as The Plurality of Science by
Suppes [52] and The Disunity of Science by Galison et al. [23];
\bullet and at the same time with the post‐modern shift of continental philosophy as repre‐
sented by the so‐called end of grand narratives thesis by (way notorious) Lyotard
[35], which was, arguably, a global phenomenon as may be observed even in the ana‐
lytic philosophy of science move from the global general philosophy of science to the
local philosophy of special sciences (from singular science to plural sciences).
\bullet Note that this change further went hand‐in‐hand with the demise of foundationalism,
the unity of sciences nearest kin and a particular kind of grand narrative as had
been endorsed by quite a majority of past philosophers longing for the so‐called
Archimedean vantage point according to Rorty in his Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature [49], who also emphasised the priority of the contingent over the absolute, and
thereby took a step towards post‐analytic philosophy (note further that the mirror of
nature was thrown away in art as well; Klee says art does not reproduce the visible).
From another angle, the rise of analytic philosophy itself was, in a way, a symptom of
disunity or the end of grand narratives in philosophy as a whole, mostly annihilating the
tradition of systematic philosophy in the Anglophone world that had still remained even
after the death of natural philosophy. Today science (including humanities) is fundamen‐
tally pluralist in various respects, and the unity of science is almost empirically refuted as
it were, not just in natural sciences but in other sciences as well. To name but a few, the
atmosphere of logic has shifted from the absolute logic of the single world to relative logics
of different domains, or from the Russell‐Wittgensteins logic as representing the structure
of the world to the Carnaps logic as endorsing the so‐called principle of tolerance, and now
logical pluralism (see, e.g., [2]) is mostly considered something obvious in practice, if not
in theory. Pure mathematics has shifted from the Bourbaki‐style conceptual modernist
mathematics juggling with generic structures to the more down‐to‐earth computational
post‐modernist mathematics with nuanced perspectives on particular structures as exem‐
plified by, say, quantum groups and low‐dimensional topology (which also utilise category
theory in substantial manners). The post‐modern mathematics is similar to the 19th
century mathematics, and yet it still builds upon the conceptual methods of modern
mathematics, which were never available at that time and allowed for solutions to several
long‐standing problems as even the general public have heard of in popular science read‐
ings. The back‐to‐premodern movement is called the (\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}‐enchantment of the world by
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Berman [7] and others, though it is basically a sociological concept and never applied to
mathematics and other formal sciences before. The recent propensity for \mathrm{t}retrieving real‐
ism [17] in both analytic and continental traditions, as exemplified by structural realism
[30] and speculative realism [41], would count as a case of re‐enchantment in philosophy
as well; note that philosophy before the realist turn had been disenchanted, from things
to ideas (the Copernican turn), and to words (the linguistic turn), according to Rorty
[50]. The move in philosophy from things, to ideas, to words, and back to things may be
compared with the move in mathematics from things, to infinities, to symbols, and back
to things. This is a finer analysis of disenchantment and re‐enchantment in philosophy
and mathematics; the same, more nuanced analysis could be elaborated for other fields
as well.
All this tells us that the notorious idea of the end of grand narratives was indeed
generally true in science as well. Yet if the post‐modernist terminology is inappropriate
I would instead rely upon the concept of unitism as opposed to that of disunitism,
which actually better illustrates the plot of the story here, that is, the transition from
unity, to disunity, and to something doing justice to both. Here I would characterise
unitism and disunitism by the presence of global meaning and absence of it, respectively;
remember that disunitism, or course, may still keep some local meanings. The end of
grand narrative, then, may be understood as the move from unitism to disunitism about
knowledge: the global unity of the kingdom of knowledge collapses (through the unexit
affair perhaps) whilst globally meaningful knowledge (resp. Truth) cuts down to separate
pieces of more local knowledge (resp. truths, which are not yet post‐truth), and the
multiply divided kingdom of disunified knowledge starts to thrive thereafter, followed by
the repeated, unending formation of more and more localised knowledge communities in
which agents are loosely interlaced with each other by their epistemic family resemblance
and in which knowledge production gets more and more localised, and only makes sense
more and more locally. Put another way, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the
following two views on the terminus of reason/science/civilisation, i.e., the final endpoint
or utmost limit to which the dynamics of reason/knowledge/society eventually leads us:
\bullet the modernist view that the world gradually converges into one and the same ideal
limit as in the Hegelian and Kantian or neo‐Kantian thoughts [20, 21, 22] (for in‐
stance because the convergence or patching condition of reason/knowledge/society
is satisfied} to the physicist this means physics finally leads to the so‐called theory
of everything, yet it is still unclear whether it happens at the end of the day or not);
\bullet the post‐modernist view that the world diverges into diverse local limits (for instance
because reason/knowledge/society is so contextual that there cannot be no unique
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limit or global element patching local elements together; to be precise there is yet
another case, i.e., there is no limit whatsoever; a toy example of this case would be
that philosophical debates or real‐life quarrels usually lead to no converging point,
people eternally arguing against each other; it is hopeless, but might be reality);
\bullet the mathematician would image what each case would look like in terms of so‐
called filter convergence or sheaf condition (the latter can actually model quantum
contextuality as done by Isham‐Butterfield and Abramsky et al although every
option is mathematically possible, nonetheless, there is usually a unique limit, i.e.,
if space involved is compact Hausdorff (see any textbook on ultrafilter convergence;
note however that ultrafilters may not exist without indeterministic principles; to
put it in logical terms, complete or maximally consistent theories may not exist).
The kingdom of knowledge is not merely a fancy metaphor: division in society and
division in knowledge (and also division in reason) are not separate phenomena, but
they are consequences of the same disposition in human history, which I characterise by
disunitism here. Whilst Lyotard focused his attention to knowledge in his end of grand
narratives thesis, it is part of the even wider tendency of meaning loss or meaning bleach
from the unitism/disunitism perspective. And this completes the first half of the shift.
There are of course countermovements against disunitism, and even proponents of dis‐
unity are not totally content with the disunity of science in some sense. The concept of
re‐enchantment by Berman [7] is actually an ideal for the future as well as an account
of the after‐modern intellectual tendency. Although we have come to naturally sepa‐
rate objects and subjects, fact and value, and so fourth, in the mechanistically divided
world after the scientific revolution in the Renaissance, and although holistic meaning has
thereby been lost in our conception of the universe, nevertheless, Berman [7] argues that
they ought to be reunited in order to overcome the problems of contemporary society and
to recover its holistic coherency in the process of the re‐enchantment of the world. Yet I
would rather argue that the mechanistic view is just dual to the holistic view of the world,
and so they are structurally equivalent to each other in a certain sense. It is even math‐
ematically true that the Newtonian mechanistic and Leibnizian holistic views of space
are indeed dually equivalent to each other. The same holds for the theory of meaning
in the analytic tradition, and the truth‐conditional and verification‐conditional semantics
may be seen as equivalent as I have argued elsewhere. This instantiates the basic idea of
duality discussed through the following sections. What is at issue here, however, is the
unity versus disunity debate. And my major point about it is that duality allows us to
reinstate unity without breaking disunity. Let us unpack the meaning of this in the case of
mechanistic and holistic views of nature. The mechanistic view is obviously different from
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the holistic one, and what duality says, of course, is not that they are equal. Although
Hegelian dialectics would urge us to find yet another view to reconcile the two views in
conflict, however, duality refuses to do so, and proposes to see them as representing the
same structure. Duality keeps pluralism in that any of the two views is not denied, and
that there is no global, third view encompassing the two views, and yet it attains unity
in that there is one and the same structure shared by them. What this pluralistic unity
means further shall be articulated in the following sections.2
2 Dualism
The major concern of the present article lies in elucidating the dynamics or logic of
duality via both philosophical and mathematical analyses. Duality has been the funda‐
mental way of human thinking as broadly seen in human intellectual history; for example,
Cartesian dualism and Hegelian dialectics instantiate (of course different) forms of duality
in a broader sense. In the following I shall illustrate philosophy as a conceptual enterprise
pursing the idea of duality, arguing that a number of fundamental problems in philosophy,
including the long‐standing realism versus antirealism issue, may be resolved by virtue of
duality. The unity of realism and antirealism has been discussed in my preceding works
[36, 38] as well. This sort of idea constitutes the philosophical strand of the present article,
and yet there is another, mathematical strand to shed light on the mechanism of dual‐
ity. In light of duality theories developed so far through the duality theorists dedicated
collaborative endeavour, I would say, we are now ready to unpack the general mechanism
of the way how duality emerges, changes, and breaks; indeed, a succinct answer to the
question shall be given later. In the following I am going to give a conceptual account of
dualism, duality, and disduality in the abstract; disduality is basically meant to be the
absence of duality, or duality‐breaking. Dualism and duality are related to each other,
and yet surely different. How they are different is not that obvious, though.
Developments of philosophy have centred around a tension between realism and an‐
tirealism (or in Gödels tems between the right and the left; see the quotation and
footnote above). And the dualistic tension may be illustrated by asking the nature of
a variety of fundamental concepts. What is Meaning? The realist asserts it consists in
the correspondence of language to reality, whilst the antirealist contends it lies in the
autonomous system or internal structure of language or linguistic practice (cf. the early
Wittgenstein [57] vs. the later Wittgenstein [58]; Davidson [14] vs. Dummett [18]). What
is Truth? To the realist, it is the correspondence of assertions to facts or states of affairs;
2In my 2016 Synthese paper I have actually formulated the idea of pluralistic unity in a httle different, more abstract
manner. The conception of pluralistic unity here may be seen as an instance of that.
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to the antirealist, it has no outward reference, constituted by the internal coherency of
assertions or by some sort of instrumental pragmatics (cf. Russell vs. Bradley [8]). What
is Being? To the realist, it is persistent substance; to the antirealist, it emerges within an
evolving process, cognition, structure, network, environment, or context (cf. Aristotle [1]
vs. Cassirer/Heidegger/Whitehead [10, 26, 56 What is Intelligence? To the realist, it
is more than behavioural simulation, characterised by the intentionality of mind; to the
antirealist, it is fully conferred by copycatting as in the Turing test or the Chinese Room
(cf. Searle [51] vs. Turing [53]). What is Space? To the realist, it is a collection of points
with no extension; to the antirealist, it is a structure of regions, relations, properties, or
information (cf. Newton vs. Leibniz [54]; Cantor/Russell vs. Husserl/Whitehead [3]). To
cast these instances of dualism in more general terms, dualism may be conceived of as
arising between the epistemic and the ontic, or between the formal and the conceptual in
Lawveres terms [32], as in the figure below:
The best known dualism, presumably, would be the Cartesian dualism between mind and
matter (or mind and body), in which the ontic realm of matter and the epistemic realm
of mind are separated. The Kantian dualism between thing‐in‐itself and appearance can
readily be seen as a case of the ontic‐epistemic dualism. Cassirer, the logical Neo‐Kantian
of the Marburg School, asserted the priority of the functional over the substantival [10],
having built a purely functional, genetic view of knowledge, which was mainly concerned
with modern science at an early stage of his thought as in Substance and Function [10],
and yet eventually evolved to encompass everything including humanities in his mature
Philosophy of Symbolic Form [11]. It is an all‐encompassing magnificent Philosophy of
Culture [34], indeed subsuming myth, art, language, humanities, and both empirical and
exact sciences. Cassirer now counts as a precursor of what is called Structural Realism
[19, 30, 31]. Yet his functionalist philosophy would better be characterised as Higher‐Order
Structural Realism, allowing for structures of structures (or abstraction of abstraction in
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a certain sense), just as in category theory. Cassirer, however, does not support ordinary
abstractionism from the concrete at all, and that he rather puts strong emphasis on the
generation of the abstract via conceptual symbolic formation with no prior reference to
reality, which itself comes out of the symbolic construction. The symbolic generation of
reality had been a central theme in his philosophy as a whole. His genetic view even payed
due attention to the process of how structures are generated, just as in type theory. In
light of this, Cassirers philosophy may be regarded as a conceptual underpinning of the
enterprise of category theory, and his dichotomy between substance and function as that
of categorical duality. Cassirer actually started his career with work on Leibniz and his
relationalism [9], at which we shall have a glance in the following.
Mathematially, the ontic‐epistemic duality is best recognised in the nature of space
aforementioned. There were two conceptions of space at the dawn of mathematical sci‐
ence: the Newtonian realist conception of absolute space and the Leibnizian antirealist
conception of relational space [54]. Hundreds of years later, Whitehead [56] recognised a
similar tension between point‐free space and point‐set space (as part of his inquiry into
Process and Reality), advocating the latter point‐free conception, which may also be found
in the phenomenology of Brentano and Husserl as well (see [3]). On the one hand, points
are recognition‐transcendent entities (just like prime ideals/filters, maximally consistent
theories, or what Hilbert called ideal elements; recall that the algebraic geometer indeed
identify points with prime ideals, which, in general, only exist with the help of the axiom
of choice or some indeterministic principle like that). On the other, regions (or any other
aforementioned entities) are more recognition‐friendly and epistemically better grounded
(just as point‐free topology can be developed constructively or even predicatively in the
formal topology style). In general, realism and antirealism are grounded upon the ontic
and the epistemic, respectively.
As shown in the figure, quite some major philosophers, whether in the analytic or
continental tradition, have wondered about versions of the ontic‐epistemic dualism. The
fundamental problem of such a dualism is to account for how the two different realms can
interact with each other; in the particular case of the Cartesian dualism, it boils down
to explicating how the mind can know about the material world when they are totally
(and so causally) separated. How can they causally interact at all when they are causally
separated? It appears impossible; this is the typical way the philosopher gets troubled by
dualism in accounting for the ontic‐epistemic interaction.
Philosophy of mathematics faces an instance of the interaction problem as well. If the
realm of mathematical objects and the realm of human existence are totally separated (in
particular causally separated), how can human beings get epistemic access to mathemat‐
ical entities? If mathematical objects exist in a Platonic universe, as in Gödels realist
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philosophy for example, it seems quite hard to account for how it is possible to have a
causal connection between humans in the ordinary universe and mathematical entities
in the Platonic universe when the two universes are causally disconnected (this sort of
problem is known as the Benacerrafs dilemma [5]). Yet if mathematical objects exist in
the mind, as in Brouwers antirealist philosophy (he counts as an antirealist at least in
the sense of Dummett [18]), the account of interaction between the ontic and the epis‐
temic is much easier, since the ontic is, just by assumption, reduced to the epistemic
in this case; by contrast, then, it gets harder to account for the existence and objectiv‐
ity of mathematical entities, especially transfinite ones. For instance, how can humans
mentally construct far‐reaching transfinite entities and does everyones mental construc‐
tion really yield the same results for sure? (To remedy the existence problem, Brouwer
actually endorsed arguably non‐constructive principles. Otherwise a continuum can be
countable as in recursive mathematics in the Russian tradition; recall that the number
of computable reals are only countably many.) Summing up, realist ontology makes it
difficult to account for the possibility of epistemic access to mathematical objects; con‐
versely, antirealist epistemology yields ontological difficulties in constructively justifying
their existence and objectivity.
A moral drawn from the above discussion is that there is a trade‐off between real‐
ism and antirealism: straightforward realist ontology leads to involved epistemology with
the urgent issue of epistemic access to entities unable to exist in our ordinary, tangi‐
ble universe; and straightforward antirealist epistemology to involved ontology with the
compelling problem of securing their existence and objectivity. In general, realism gets
troubled by our accessibility to abstract entities; antirealism faces a challenge of warrant‐
ing their existence and objectivity. Put simply, an easier ontology of something often
makes its epistemology more difficult, and vice versa. Something seems reversed between
realist/ontological and antirealist/epistemological worldviews. And this is where the idea
of duality between realism and antirealism comes into the play.
3 Duality
Everything, from Truth and Meaning to Being and Mind, has dual facets as aforemen‐
tioned. Conceptually, duality theory, in turn, is an attempt to unite them together with
the ultimate aim of showing that they are the two sides of one and the same coin. Put
another way, duality allows two things opposed in dualism to be reconciled and united
as just two different appearances of one and the same fundamental reality; in this sense,
duality is a sort of monism established on the top of dualism (cf. Hegelian dialectics
as in Lawveres philosophy of mathematics). In Dummetts philosophy on the theory of
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meaning, for example, he makes a binary opposition between realism and antirealism (cf.
Platonism and Intuitionism/Constructivism); what is at stake there is basically the legit‐
imacy of recognition‐transcendent truth conditions, which is allowed in realism, but not
in antirealism. As in my recent works [36, 38 however, the realist and antirealist con‐
ceptions of meaning may be reconciled and united as sharing the same sort of structure,
even if they are literally opposed. In view of Dummetts constitution thesis, according to
which the content of metaphysical (anti)realism is constituted by semantic (anti)realism
[18, 42], this would arguably count as a unification of metaphysics as well as the theory
of meaning. Duality thus conceived is a constructive canon to deconstruct dualism as it
were.
Whilst having posed the Cartesian dualism as aforementioned, Descartes also developed
analytic geometry, which is in a sense a precursor of duality between algebra and geometry,
even though he might not have been aware that systems of equations are dual to spaces
of their zero loci (logically paraphrasing, this amounts to the fact that systems of axioms
are dual to spaces of their models; and such correspondence between logic and algebraic
geometry can be made precise in duality theory). Notwithstanding that Galois theory
may be seen as an instance of duality, Galois himself would not have been aware of the
essentially categorical duality underpinning his theory, either. It would, then, be Riemann
who first discovered duality between geometry and algebra in amathematically substantial
form; indeed he showed how to reconstruct (what are now called) Riemann surfaces from
function fields, and vice versa, thereby establishing the (dual) equivalence between them.
Even earlier than Riemann, however, Dedekind‐WeUer and Kronecker (mathematically)
gave a purely algebraic conception of space, a sort of precursor of what is now called
point‐free geometry (philosophically, it would date back to Leibniz as aforementioned).
The history of duality in mathematical form, thus, goes back to the late 19th century (it
ought to be noted here that duality in mathematical form basically means categorically
representable duality, and so duality in projective geometry, for example, does count as
an origin of duality in this sense; it would not be categorically representable, at least
to my knowledge). Duality then flourished in the early 20th century, as exemplified
by Hilberts, Stones, Gelfands, and Pontryagins dualities (Hilberts Nullstellensatz is
essentially a dual equivalence between finitely generated reduced  k‐algebras and varieties
over k for an algebraically closed field k ). The discovery of dualities was thereafter followed
by applications to functional analysis, general topology, and universal algebra on the one
hand, and to algebraic geometry, representation theory, and number theory on the other
(interestingly, the Pontryagin duality plays a vital rôle in number theory as exemplified
by André Weils Basic Number Theory [55]). And it was eventually accompanied by
the rise of categorical language in the late 20th century, which, in particular, allowed
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one to identify a universal form of duality (before category theory it was only vaguely
understood what exactly different dualities have in common, and no one was able to spell
out what presicely duality is). Today there are a great variety of dualities found across
quite different kinds of science as in the following figure (and even in engineering such
as optimisation, linear programming, control theory, and electrical circuit theory; duality
thus goes far beyond pure mathematics, and it may sometimes be of genuine practical use
as in those engineering theories):
These dualities are diverse at first sight, and yet tightly intertwined with each other in
their conceptual structures. To pursue links between different dualities is indeed one of
the principal aims of duality theory in category theory. Having a look at the above pic‐
ture of dualities, it is particularly notable that the physics duality between states and
observables is, in a way, akin to the informational duality between systems and observ‐
able properties/behaviours. How could we, then, shed light on structural analogies and
disanalogies between diverse dualities? What is the generic structure or architecture of
duality in the first place? Such questions propel the investigation of categorical duality
theory. The duality‐theoretical correspondence between logic and algebraic geometry il‐
lustrates what Ulam calls an analogy between analogies in mathematics; note that the
Stone duality is concerned with equivalence between syntax and semantics, and it is actu‐
ally a strengthened version of the Gödels completeness theorem (to reinforce this point,
it is named Gödel‐Stone in the picture; technically, the injectivity of an evaluation map
in the Stone duality exactly amounts to completeness, whereas the surjectivity, though
more involved to prove, is a pure surplus from the completeness point of view). The
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computer science duality above is, in its mathematical substance, a form of Stone duality,
and even the physics duality between states and observables may be formulated in the
Stone duality style. Quite some part of the duality picture above, therefore, boils down
to Stone duality, the birds‐eye view of which shall be given below. As evident in the
above picture of categorical dualities, category theory today has found widespread appli‐
cations in diverse disciplines of science beyond mathematics; it would now be more like
foundations of science in general than foundations of mathematics in particular.3
Duality is even crucial for Hilberts programme, as Coquand et al. [13] assert:
A partial realisation of Hilberts programme has recently proved successful in
commutative algebra One of the key tools is Joyals point‐free version of the
Zariski spectrum as a distributive lattice
In [13] they contrive a constructive version of Grothendiecks schemes by replacing their
base spaces with point‐free ones through the Stone duality for distributive lattices. From
a categorical point of view, we could say that the spectrum functor Spec : Al\mathrm{g}^{} \rightarrow \mathrm{S}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}
from an algebraic category Alg to a topological category Spa amounts to the introduction
of ideal elements in Hilberts sense, and its adjoint functor the elimination of them. Dual‐
ity, therefore, has contributed to Hilberts programme and constructivism. The point‐free
Tychonoff theorem is constructive; this is classic. Yet the state‐of‐the‐art goes far beyond
it, encompassing not just general topology but also some mainstream mathematics such
as Grothendiecks scheme theory.
In light of rich duality theories developed so far, we give succinct answers to the three
questions on the mechanism of duality (for detail, see my DPhil thesis [39]):
\bullet How does duality emerge? It is when the dual aspects of a single entity are in har‐
mony with each other; what I call the harmony condition explicates this harmony.
Dual adjunctions emerge when algebraic structures are harmonious with topological
structures, according to (the harmony condition of) the duality theory via categor‐
ical topology and algebra. In dual adjunctions between algebras and spaces, the
harmony condition basically means that the algebraic operations induced on the
spectra of algebras are continuous. Dual equivalences are determined by the ratio
of existing term functions over all functions, according to (my understanding of)
natural duality theory.
'This is the thing category theory has aimed at since its early days. Granted that quite some category theorists had
more or less foundationalist doctrines, nevertheless, it would be appropriate to think of category theory as local relative
foundations rather than global absolute foundations, which is what set theory is about in the nature of the universe or
the cumulative hierarchy of sets, just as base change is a fundamental idea of category theory. Set theory can support a
multiverse view as shown in recent developments, and yet category theory intrinsically does so, I would say. Note also that
the practice of mathematics is concerned with different combinations of set‐theoretical and category‐theoretical ideas, and
the binary opposition between set theory and category theory are not very constructive or fruitful in practice, apart from
philosophical issues.
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\bullet How does duality mutate? Dual structures get simplified as term functions increase;
this is what natural duality theory tells us. As a limiting case, if existing term
functions are all functions ( \mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}. , functional completeness in logical terms), then dual
spaces are Stone (aka. Boolean) spaces (this is the primal duality theorem; extra
structures on space are indispensable in the quasi‐primal duality theorem). If con‐
tinuous functions coincide with term functions, then dual structures are coherent
spaces (this could be called continuous functional completeness, which entails Stone
duality with respect to coherent spaces).
\bullet How does duality break? It is caused by either an excess of the ontic or an ex‐
cess of the epistemic, as shall be discussed below. There are some impossibility
theorems known in non‐commutative algebra [6], which exhibits an excess of the
epistemic. This can however be remedied by means of sheaf theory. The idea of non‐
commutative duality theory via sheaf theory is simple: we take the commutative
core of a non‐commutative algebra, dualise it, and equip the dual space with a sheaf
structure to account for the non‐commutative part. The same methods works for a
broad variety of non‐commutative algebras, including operator algebras, quantales,
and substructural logics. In substructural logics, the method is further extended
in such a way that in general we take the structural core of a substructural logic,
dualise it, and endow a sheaf structure with it to take care of the substructural part.
This process may be expressed by means of the general concept of Grothendieck
situations. (For detail, see my DPhil thesis [39].)
To elucidate how duality changes in logical contexts in particular, for example, when you
weaken/strengthen your logic or extend it with operators, let us also present a birds‐eye
view of different logical dualities in a rough and yet intuitive manner. Stone‐type dualities
basically tell us that the algebras of propositions are dual to the spaces of models in the
following fashion:
\bullet Classical logic is dual to zero‐dimensional Hausdorff spaces.
‐ Propositions are closed opens, for which the law of excluded middle (LEM) holds,
since the union of a closed open and its complement, which is closed open again,
is equal to the entire space.
\bullet Intuitionistic logic is dual to certain non‐Hausdorff spaces, that is, compact sober
spaces such that its compact opens form a basis, and the interiors of their boolean
combinations are compact.4
4This definition of Heyting spaces came out of my joint work with K. Sato; Luries Higher Topos Theory [33] gives yet
another definition.
88
‐ Propositions are compact opens. The topological meaning of LEM is zero‐
dimensionality. In general it does not hold because the complement of a compact
open is not necessarily compact open.
\bullet Modal logic is dual to Vietoris coalgebras over topological spaces.
‐ Modal operators amount to Kripke relations or Vietoris hyperspaces. This is
what is called Abramsky‐Kupke‐Kurz‐Venema duality in the thesis, relating to
powerdomain constructions in domain theory as well.
Note that the existence of unit ensures that duals spaces are compact (all elements of a
finitary algebra concerned yield compact subspaces, and so, if there is a unit element, the
entire space is compact); otherwise they are only locally compact. The same holds for the
Gelfand duality as well. There are, of course, even more logical systems you can think of:
\bullet First‐order logic may be dualised by two approaches: topological groupoids (\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}.,
spaces of models with automorphisms) and indexed/fibrational topological spaces
(i.e., duals of Lawvere hyperdoctrines).
‐ The latter approach extends to higher‐order logic, thus giving duals of triposes
or higher‐order hyperdoctrines. It just topologically dualise the propositional
value category of a hyperdoctrine or tripos.
\bullet Infinitary logic forces us to take not even locally compact spaces into account, just like
the duality for frames (aka. locales). And the resulting duality is a dual adjunction
in general, rather than a dual equivalence.
‐ There may not be enough models or points to separate non‐equivalent proposi‐
tions. There is no need for the axiom of choice thanks to infinitary operations,
i.e., no need to reduce infinitaries on the topological side into finitaries on the
algebraic. Note that all the other dualities require the axiom of choice to warrant
the existence of enough points.
\bullet Many‐valued logics are diverse. It depends what sort of dual structure appears. It
is, e.g., rational polyhedra for Lukasiewicz logic. For other logics, dual structures
often include multi‐ary relations on spaces as in natural duality theory.
‐ Dualities for many‐valued logics are mostly subsumed under the framework of
dualities induced by Janusian (aka. schizophrenic) objects  $\Omega$ , or Chu duality
theory on value objects  $\Omega$ , which may be multiple‐valued. (For detail, see [39].)
You can combine some of these, and thereby obtain more complex dualities for more
complex systems. Some compatibility conditions between different sorts of structures
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are usually required, and yet there is no general method to generate them so far. The
structure of duality combinations and coherency conditions thus required would be worth
further elucidation. Note that this is a rough picture of dualities in logic, and there are
some inaccuracies and omissions. Notice also that not all of these dualities are induced
by Janusian (aka. schizophrenic) objects, including those for intuitionistic and modal
logics, in which implication and modality, respectively, are not pointwise operations on
their spectra (for mode detailed accounts see [39]).
4 Disduality
The absence of duality, what is named disduality in the present article, is just as in‐
teresting on its own right as the presence of duality. According to the discussion so far,
duality is about the relationships between the epistemic and the ontic. What is disdual‐
ity then? In a nutshell, disduality is about an excess of the epistemic or the ontic; the
duality correspondence collapses when either of the ontic and the epistemic is excessive.
To articulate what is really meant here, let us focus upon two cases of disduality in the
following: one is caused by incompleteness and the other by non‐commutativity as in
quantum theory. The former shall give a case of the excess of the ontic, and the latter a
case of the excess of the epistemic.
As mentioned above, completeness may be seen as a form of duality between theories
and models. What Gödels first incompleteness theorem tells us is that there are not
enough formal theories to characterise the truths of intended model(s) concerned, or to
put it differently, there are some models which are unable to be axiomatised via formal
theories, where theories are, of course, assumed to be finitary (or recursively axiomatis‐
able) and stronger than the Robinson arithemetic (the technical statement of this is that
the set of stronger‐than‐Robinson truths is not recursively enumerable). If you allow for
infinitary theories, you can nonetheless obtain a complete characterisation, for example,
of arithmetical truths, and yet this is not acceptable from an epistemological point of
view, such as Hilberts finitism. This is a case of disduality due to the excess of the ontic.
We now turn to the other kind of disduality.
Let us have a look at a case of the excess of the epistemic. There is some sort of
incompleteness in quantum algebra. The Gelfand duality tells us there is a dual equiva‐
lence between (possibly nonunital) commutative C‐algebras and locally compact Haus‐
dorff spaces. There have been different attempts to generalise it so as to include non‐
commutative algebras, in particular algebras of observables in quantum theory, and yet,
as long as the duals of non‐commutative algebras are purely topological, this is actually
impossible (see [6]). The duality between space and algebra, thus, does not extend to
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the quantum realm of non‐commutativity. This is indeed a case of disduality due to the
excess of the epistemic: there are too many non‐commutative algebras, compared to the
available amount of topological spaces. The disduality may be remedied to extend the
notion of space so as to include, for example, sheaves of algebras in addition to topological
spaces per se (just as Grothendieck indeed did in his scheme‐theoretical duality); in such
a case, however, both sides of duality get more or less algebraic (the same may be said
about the Tannaka duality for noncommutative compact groups, in which case duals are
categories of representations, and so fairly algebraic).
There is another thought on the notion of disduality. No canonical agreement exists
on what duality means in the first place even among category theorists as well as among
philosophers. For example, some say duality is dual equivalence, whilst others say it is
dual adjunction in general. A weaker notion of duality could count as a kind of (weaker)
disduality. In that case we can see how far dual adjunctions are from, and yet how they
(technically always but practically sometimes) transform into, dual equivalences. The
different between dual equivalences and dual adjunctions do matter from a philosophical
point of view. Think, for example, of physics, which may be seen as pursuing the duality
between reality and observation (recall the state‐observable duality above). If there is a
perfect balance between reality and observation that means there is a dual equivalence
between them. Yet if there is more reality than can be reconstructed from observation
then it is a dual adjunction which is not a dual equivalence. Likewise if there are more
observational or epistemic differences than reality can metaphysically accommodate then
it is, again, a dual adjunction which is not a dual equivalence. This is not just about
physics, and there are, for example, subtle theories of different balances between states
and observation in theoretical computer science. What this sort of story tells us is that
there can still be some sort of weaker duality (e.g., adjunction) even in the presence of
disduality (e.g., non‐equivalence). From this point of view, the difference between duality
and disduality may be considered relative and continuous, the transition between them
being gradual.
Disduality is not anything uncommon. If you have more models than theories, or
if you have more theories than models, you have disduality. If you have more spaces
than equations can represent as solution spaces, or if you have more equations than
spaces can distinguish, you have disduality. If you have more reality than language can
express, or you have more language than reality can differentiate, you have disduality. The
entire enterprise of science is, in a way, about elucidating duality or disduality between
formulae and solutions ( \mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}. , substantival entities satisfying them), just as philosophy has
centred around the dualism between the epistemic and the ontic. The duality/disduality
between formulae and solutions is crystal‐clear in logic and geometry, as seen in the
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formal correspondence between logic and algebraic geometry, and it further holds up for
analysis and physics as well. Given the Schrödinger equation, for example, you can think
of the Hilbert space of solutions, which inform us of the micro structure of the quantum
universe. What if the Schrödinger equation is non‐linear? You have just got an infinite‐
dimensional simplectic manifold as the solution space. Given the Einstein equation, you
can think of the manifold of solutions, which tells you about the macro structure of
the relativistic universe.5 If there are not enough solutions to realise equations, or if
there are not enough equations to formalise solutions, you have disduality (otherwise you
have complete duality), and knowing about that is a gain in the enterprise of science,
as Gödel incompleteness served as a fruitful theorem for later developments in different
fields. Disduality is a general idea of the limit of the epistemic or the ontic. In Godel
incompleteness, what is incomplete is the epistemic, and yet in principle, it can be the
other way around. And indeed it is the case in quantum theory that what is incomplete
is the ontic as non‐commutativity tells us (that is to say, reality is incomplete rather than
quantum theory is incomplete). Duality and disduality are not fancy rhetoric, but they
do pin down the fundamental meaning and limit of the scientific enterprise. Although
this sounds like a bold claim, nonetheless, it is arguably supported, and to some extent
justified, by numerous cases of science in which duality and disduality play central rôles.
We can even shed new light on the so‐called frame problem in (philosophy of) artificial
intelligence from the disduality point of view. It is concerned with the fundamental
limitation of the computational theory of mind. My abstract formulation of the frame
problem is as follows:
\bullet Dimensions of reality are possibly infinite;
\bullet Need \mathrm{a} (finitary) frame to reduce possibly infinite dimensions and to identify the
finitary scope of relevant information;
\bullet Need \mathrm{a} (finitary) meta‐frame to choose a frame because there are possibly infinitely
many frames;
\bullet This meta‐frame determination process continues ad infinitum.
Here every frame is assumed to be finitary, as every formal system is assumed to be finitary
(i.e., recursively axiomatisable) in the standard formulation of incompleteness theorem.
This argument applies to any sort of finitary entity, and so, if the human is a finitary
entity then it applies to the human as well as the machine. What is essential in the frame
problem is the finitude of beings. From this point of view, the frame problem is about the
'What the structure of a physical theory is has been a central issue in recent developments of structural realism in the
analytic philosophy of science. There could be different solutions. For one thing, the structure of a physical theory may be
understood as the structure of the solution space of fundamental equation as explained here.
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fundamental disduality between the finitude of beings and the infinity of reality; Gödel
incompleteness tells us there is no finitary means to characterise (stronger‐than‐Robinson‐
arithmetic) truths (more formally saying, the truths are not recursively enumerable).
And the finitude of beings is rooted in the temporality of beings (as Heidegger says); if
temporality is ignored the intelligence system may compute for an infinite amount of time
and hence no need for singling a finitary frame out and for being worried about the frame
problem. Or if an infinitary frame is allowed then there is no frame problem any more.
The same happens in incompleteness: if an infinitary system or infinitary computation
is allowed then there is no incompleteness any more, that is, there are complete systems
characterising the truths. The finitarity assumption is crucial in both phenomena. It may
thus be said that the frame problem and Gödelian incompleteness are essentially the same
phenomena. The notirous Lucas‐Penrose argument [40] for the impossibility of artificial
intelligence on the ground of incompleteness has already been much criticised by many
(e.g., by Feferman). In my opinion, they may be wrong about the impossibility of artificial
intelligence; however, their overall point seems to be something similar to the point of my
argument above, or at least my (possibly biased) interpretation of their argument is so.
The Lucas‐Penrose argument is essentially about a limitation of the computational
theory of mind, and it could be adapted so as to be applicable for the computational
theory of the universe or the so‐called information physics (see, e.g., [12]):
\bullet If anything (or any mechanism) in the universe allows for solving uncomputable
problems then the universe cannot be computational, i.e., any computational system
cannot simulate the universe (if it can that means the computer can solve uncom‐
putable problems and this is a contradiction);
\bullet The corresponding version for the computational theory of mind (there are many
versions of the Lucas‐Penrose argument): if the human mind can solve undecid‐
able problems it cannot be computational, i.e., there is no computational system to
simulate it (put another way, artificial intelligence is impossible).
\bullet What is crucial here is that if the human mind can solve undecidable problems
then there is something in the universe which can compute uncomputable problems
and thus the universe cannot be computational. That is, if the human mind is
more powerful than the computing system the universe cannot be simulated by the
computing system because humans are part of the universe.
The last point may be put this way: if artificial intelligence is impossible, information
physics is impossible, too. So it exposes an interesting, unexpected link between the
possibility of artificial intelligence and that of information physics. And all this is about
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the fundamental disduality between finitary beings and infinitary reality. This completes
the discussion on the trichotomy of dualism, duality, and disduality.
5 The Logic of Duality in the Kyoto School
This is the final section for concluding remarks; notwithstanding, I would dare to ad‐
dress yet another facet of duality rather than to give boringly superficial wrapping‐up
conclusions. No one would ever imagine categorical duality relates to the Kyoto school of
philosophy [15], and nevertheless it indeed does as I am going to argue in the following.
And the argument is really simple, I would say. We have started the discussion with
the understanding of modernism as the disunity of worldviews, which is actually shared
by the Kyoto school of philosophy. The Kyoto schools ideal of overcoming modernity
[44] precisely lies in going beyond the disunity of worldviews (via integration of Western
and Japanese/Eastern/Oriental thoughts). Indeed, Nishitani, a member of the Kyoto
school, says that modernisation has divided our worldview into three conflicting ones: the
nature‐centred worldview, the human‐centred worldview, and the God‐centred worldview
[44].
It may be said that, after the loss of global order or global meaning, which is the
major characteristic of modern disunitism, the cosmos as a holistically united whole has
become the universe as a physical entity, and accordingly cosmology has come down
to mere materialistic studies on the universe. Although some argue for the value of
disunity as the Stanford school indeed does, nonetheless, the Kyoto school regarded the
Construction of a Unified Worldview as the Fundamental Challenge of the Contemporary
Era in Nishitanis terms [44]. This sort of ideal for unity may be traced back to the even
older Amane Nishis programme Interweaving a Hundred Sciences [43], and it would
be fair to say that it has been a distinctively Japanese ideal to integrate the Western
system of knowledge and the Japanese/Eastern/Oriental one. Yet at the same time
the Kyoto school philosophy of overcoming modernity is naturally interlaced with the
problematics of modernity in the Western world in many respects and in astonishingly
substantial manners. For instance, Nishida [47, 43], the central founder of the Kyoto
school, attempts to overcome the division of subjects and objects on the basis of his
theory of pure experience, and his problematisation of the subject‐object dichotomy is
exactly the same as Bermans in his enterprise of re‐enchantment. The philosophy of
the Kyoto school has centred around the resolution of dichotomies; this would already
suggest it may somehow relate to the idea of duality. Yet if we have a look at the Kyoto
schools studies on logic (which is never meant to be mathematical logic, apart from
the early philosophy of science by Tanabe, who paid a lot of attention to developments
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of mathematical sciences) the compellingly tight relationships between duality and the
Kyoto school would have become crystal‐clear.
Major members of the Kyoto school have endorsed the common logic of (absolute) noth‐
ingness, including Nishida and Nishitani.6 It is also called the logic of topos in Nishidas
philosophy. The logic of nothingness is inspired by both Japanese/Eastern/Oriental phi‐
losophy and Western one such as Hegelian dialectics, and there are actually diverse ac‐
counts of it, some of which might not be equivalent. Here I follow Nishidas account in
his treatise entitled Absolutely Contradictory Self‐Identity or Absolutely Paradoxical
Self‐Identity [45] (the title is hard to translate into English; the former is adopted more
frequently than the latter). He there addresses the absolutely contradictory self‐identity
between unity and plurality, arguing that that is the right way to conceive of the world.
The details of the argument does not matter here; what does matter, rather, is the pat‐
tern of his logic. He then relates it to the absolutely contradictory self‐identity between
appearance and reality, to that between subjects and environments, and to that between
the mechanistic view and the teleological view. And he further repeats, again and again,
this absolutely contradictory self‐identity logic for different dichotomies in the same arti‐
cle and elsewhere as well. The same pattern can be found in other Kyoto school thinkers
writings. Given a dichotomy between two things, they resolve the conflict or division
between them by means of equating them. This is the simple structure of the logic of
(absolute) nothingness. You would, of course, wonder why it is justified to equate them.
There are some complex arguments for it, yet from a contemporary point of view, we can
appeal to duality to equate them. Duality is precisely the means of equating two things
whilst keeping them different. And this is the fundamental reason why the logic of duality
shares the same structure as the logic of (absolute) nothingness.
In face of a conflict/division/dichotomy between two things /\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}/terms, there are
different strategies to treat it, possibly including doing nothing for it. One is Hegelian
dialectics, that is, to find yet another, global thing /\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{w}/term as encompassing both
of them. Another would be Derridas deconstruction, which attacks the condition of
possibility of the conflict/division/dichotomy, thereby destructing it in its very foundation.
And yet another strategy is duality or the logic of (absolute) nothingness, which does not
rely upon any grand narrative such as Hegelian synthesis, and which elucidates absolutely
non‐contradictory structural identity between them. In particular, philosophy tends to
differentiate and oppose positions, and there has not been much attention to looking at
'Thnabes logic of species is a little different from their logic of nothingness, concerned with the logic of the relationships
between individuals and societies, or those between points and spaces. As recent research [25] shows, Tanabe indeed read
Brouwers theory of continuums, which is an origin of what is now called point‐free topology, and applied it in social
contexts. The priority of societies/spaces over individuals/points had let to some sort of totalitarianism, which may be
called point‐free sociology, and he came to be criticised by that after the WWII. It made post‐war researchers away from
his philosophy, thus having delayed the dissemination of his work after the war. And yet there is some revival now.
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structural similarities between different philosophies such as realism and antirealism. The
realist conception of space and the antirealist one are provably equivalent [39]. The realist
conception of meaning and the antirealist one are arguably equivalent (as model‐theoretic
and proof‐theoretic semantics are categorically equivalent [36, 38 These are exactly the
same sort of enterprises as the Kyoto school undertook for different opposing positions as
addressed above. Duality and the Kyoto school are united at this cardinal point.7
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